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African Family and Kinship
Brian Siegel
(from "Family and Kinship," pp. 221-47 in April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon, eds.,
Understanding Contemporary Africa, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996)

“Don’t be fooled,” advised a senior Zambian bureaucrat. “Here in Africa, the family is first.
This will never change.” I was on my way to study the labor strategies of Copperbelt market
gardeners, and I had told him my plans to consult the local officials charged with “developing”
the “static rural masses.” One should not, he advised, accept such programs at face value, for
government offices and officials would never inspire the same loyalties as those of family ties.
The significance of such ties was dramatically illustrated in 1983, when 1.3 million
migrant workers from Ghana—nearly one-tenth of all Ghanaians—were suddenly deported
from Nigeria. Things looked bad, for severe drought had only worsened the chronic crisis that
is the Ghanaian economy. Western relief agencies drew up plans for emergency camps to feed
and house the deportees. Yet, this particular crisis soon evaporated, for within two weeks the
Ghanaian deportees had all disappeared back into their families at home (Harden, 1990:6).
Still, those who honor their family obligations may do so out of a mixed sense of
cynicism, dread, and guilt. Consider the Ghanaian sociologist Kwasi Oduro. With his mother’s
support, he became the first university graduate in his family. In spite of his enviable teaching
job in Accra, his government salary cannot properly support his wife and five children. Yet, he
shares his three-bedroom home with eleven home-village cousins (his classificatory brothers
and sisters) and, during his rare visits home, cannot refuse his mother’s, mother’s sister’s, and
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sister’s desperate requests for cash. “I want out of the extended family trap,” hey says, “and
when my mother dies I don’t think I’ll go back to the village anymore” (Harden, 1990:94).
Family ties are sometimes strained, and Africans do not always honor the ideals of
family loyalty. Yet, it is important to note that such cultural ideals are as common to African
societies as those of personal autonomy are in our own.



COMPARING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY FORMS

Families take different forms and are invested with different meanings. Whereas we in
the United States typically conceive of family as conjugal, or nuclear, that composed of a
married couple and their children, Africans generally use the term to denote the extended
family, several generations of relatives living at home and away.
Still other aspects of the African family are best understood in terms of the broad
historical contrast Jack Goody (1976) draws between Eurasian and black African societies. The
preindustrial societies of Europe and Asia were generally based on labor-intensive regimes of
plow and/or irrigation agriculture. Here, where permanent and heritable land-ownership was
the primary index of wealth and status, marriage was wrapped up in property considerations.
Polygamy (except in Muslim societies) was prohibited, premarital sex was discouraged, and
parents used whatever property they held—the son’s heritable estate or daughter’s dowry—to
ensure that their children maintained their social position by marrying within their own (or a
higher-ranking) class or caste. Such considerations often delayed the age of marriage, and they
prevented some—the elderly bachelors or spinsters from poor but honorable families—from
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ever marrying at all. In this respect, idealized celibacy, monasteries, and convents were
peculiar to Eurasian societies.
Black African societies were very different, for most were based on labor-saving forms
of slash-and-burn horticulture (or hoe-farming), in which crops are grown in the ash beds left
after cut and dried trees and brush are burned. Thus, garden and even village sites are shifted as
the old, unproductive gardens are abandoned. As Africa was generally marked by poor soils
and low population densities, land was relatively abundant, and wealth and status were not
measured in terms of necessarily impermanent land-use rights, but in control over the laborers
needed to work the land. African societies had rulers, subjects, and slaves, but few had
landlords, tenants, or serfs. This general lack of class or caste distinctions also meant that
marriage patterns were relatively open, for even chiefs and kings, by marrying outside their own
lineages or clan, had to marry commoners.
Accordingly, Africans still view marriage as a means for begetting children rather than a
strategy for maximizing landed estates and class positions. There is no tradition of idealized
celibacy, and many societies take a relatively casual view of premarital sex. Infertility and
infant mortality are terrible personal tragedies, for children are desired and loved, Children are
also the markers of adult status and are essential for becoming an immortal (i.e., remembered)
ancestor; therefore, all normal adults expect to marry—and not just once, but often several
times. This is obviously true of men, for all African societies permit polygyny (the practice of
having more than one wife), but women also participate in the common pattern of early
marriage, divorce(s), and remarriage.
Let me offer a personal example of African ideas about marriage and children. My first
child was conceived within days of my wife’s arrival in Zambia. No sooner did the hospital
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confirm her pregnancy than I took her out to meet my Lamba village hosts. Evenings there are
spent chatting around a fire, but one night she was just too exhausted to participate. Although it
is Lamba custom not to tempt fate by discussing the yet unborn, I thought it better to tell our
hosts about her condition than have them think her unsociably “proud.”
Our conversation took a revealing turn. They wanted to know all about us, beginning
with our ages and our previous children, living or dead. Since we had none, they suggested that
she married me after her first marriage proved childless, a common ground for divorce. I
certainly seemed to be fertile, so they then asked about my other wives and children. No, I
insisted, though we were both in out late twenties, neither of us had been married before, and
we had chosen to remain childless through a lengthy courtship and nearly three years of
marriage.
My friends were surprised. They had just been lamenting Zambia’s rising cost of living,
so I explained that life in the United States was so expensive that we often delay marriage and
children until we can afford them. Now these Baptist villagers were upset. What had money to
do with marriage and children? They were our purpose here on earth. They had always heard
we Basungu (whites) were a money-minded people, but they had never imagined us to be so
perverted as to reduce marriage and childbearing to monetary calculations!
Goody (1976) is right. African ideas of marriage and family are, in these respects, very
different from our own.
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UNILINEAL DESCENT AND DESCENT GROUPS

Families take different forms, and kinship or family ties can be computed in different ways.
Most North Americans are raised in one nuclear family, then, after marriage, begin another.
We also have extended families, which may assemble for relatives’ birthdays, weddings, and
funerals. But we rarely live with them, for our custom is that of neolocal (literally, “new
place”) postmarital residence.
In fact, we all have more or less distant kin whom we barely know. And even those we
do know, like our paternal and maternal cousins, are not necessarily related to each other. This
is because we have a bilateral kinship system and trace family ties through the males and
females on both our mother’s and father’s sides of the family. Bilateral descent gives us the
largest kinship network of any descent system ever invented. But it makes it difficult to keep
track of our kin. And this, together with neolocality, makes it nearly impossible to use kinship
in structuring our social order.
The African notion of "family," by contrast, typically refers to the extended family system.
Not only do members of an African extended family often live together, but they find it
relatively easy to keep track of their kin. This is because the vast majority of African peoples
have unilineal ("one line") descent systems that trace kinship through just one sex—either
patrilineally, through a line of fathers, or matrilineally, through a line of mothers. With
unilineal descent, Africans create still larger familistic groups, the unilineal descent groups
called the lineage and clan.
genealogical depth.

The difference between the two is largely one of size and

While the members of a given lineage can spell out their precise

genealogical links, the members of a clan—which is usually composed of many constituent
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lineages—only know that they are somehow related. Such descent groups are so large and
encompassing that they conveniently structure the organization of social life.
The point should be stressed here that while lineage members can specify their genealogical
links, these are representations of sociological ancestry and do not always constitute objective
historical or biological facts. Until the advent of writing, elders were free to interpret and edit
their genealogical knowledge, and there is, over time, a common tendency for the smaller, less
prolific lineage segments or lineage dependents, like the descendants of domestic slaves, to be
assigned a suitable ancestor and be incorporated into its dominant segments. Wilson (1979:5355), for example, tells how, from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, European and
Muslim shipwreck victims along the southeastern African coast were absorbed into the
neighboring chiefdoms' descent groups. And Lan (1985) tells how, during the 1971-1980
liberation struggle in northeastern Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe's ZANU guerrillas established
identities as the symbolic "grandchildren" of the local Shona's ancient chiefs.
The patrilineal Nuer of southern Sudan, as described by Evans-Pritchard (1940), inspired
generations of anthropologists to study the genealogical charter of African social life.
According to Evans-Pritchard (1950:368), any Nuer "can establish kinship of some kind—real,
assumed, by analogy, mythological, or just fictitious—with everybody he comes into contact
with during this lifetime and throughout the length and breadth of Nuerland… for all social
obligation of a personal kind is defined in terms of kinship." Their patrilineal social structure is
more accurately understood as an idealized model of the society (Gough, 1971; Mair, 1974:124,
133-134; Southall, 1986).

In short, kinship is less a "God's truth" account of objective

historical fact than an ideological framework, or plausible sociological fiction, for the ordering
of social life (Moore, 1969; Karp, 1978; Vansina, 1980).
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In theory, then, every individual is born into a conceptually immortal descent group that
includes the living, the dead (ancestors), and the yet unborn. Like the corporations in our own
society, a lineage or clan transcends the lifetimes of its individual members and controls
property rights to such things as land and herds, leadership positions, and spiritual powers. As
each lineage or clan is a giant extended family, its members must marry outside their own
descent group. Thus, marriage more closely resembles an alliance of two preexisting families
than the creation of a new one. And, like family, lineage or clan members have a collective
obligation to assist one another, especially when it comes to settling disputes or paying
compensation for each other's mistakes.
A final characteristic of the unilineal extended family is its lumping of different kin together
under the same kinship term. Take parents, for example. The term "father" almost always
includes your father's brothers, and the term "mother" includes your mother's sisters. The
children of all these "mothers" and "fathers" (half of your cousins) are your "brothers" and
"sisters"; and among most African peoples their children are your "children" too. While you
cannot have sex with or marry your "brothers" and "sisters" (i.e., father's brothers' and mother's
sisters' children), your "aunt's" (father's sisters') and "uncle's" (mother's brothers') children are
fair game because they do not belong to either parent's descent group. In fact, these "cousins"
(the other half of your cousins) are often your preferred marriage partners.
This may sound awfully confusing, but it does not entail any confusion over biological
parentage. Such classificatory kinship terms merely reflect the elegant simplicity of unilineal
descent and tell individuals how they are expected to relate to one another. My Lamba friends
were just as baffled by our indiscriminate lumping of aunts, uncles, and cousins, and wondered
how we managed to tell them all apart.

8



AFRICAN DESCENT AND RESIDENCE PATTERNS

Patriliny, or descent through males, is the most common descent system in Africa and
throughout the world. It is strongly associated with the pastoral (herding) peoples of the
savannas of western and eastern Africa—like the Fulani (Fulbe) peoples (stretching from
Senegambia to the Central African Republic), the Nuer (southern Sudan), and the Maasai
(western Kenya and Tanzania). But it is also common to a wide variety of horticultural
peoples—like the stateless Tiv (east-central Nigeria) and Gikuyu (central Kenya), and the statelevel Yoruba (southwestern Nigeria) and Ganda (Uganda). All of these, like the vast majority
of patrilineal peoples, practice patrilocality, in which, after marriage, the bride leaves home to
live with or near her husband's family.
Descent was formerly regarded as a primary social fact, but Murdock (1949) persuaded
most anthropologists that descent systems result from the composition of cooperative work
groups and consequent patterns of postmarital residence. More recent research has broadened
the notion of cooperative work to include warfare and trade with subsistence activities, for a
key predictor of residence is whether a people have a history of internal or external warfare
(Ember and Ember, 1971; Divale, 1974). Where a people has a history of internal warfare—
intercommunity raiding between people speaking the same language—patrilocality and patriliny
seem to result from the clear advantage of keeping a defensive core of related fathers, brothers,
and sons living together in one place. Where, on the other hand, warfare was purely external, or
between different peoples, patrilocality and patriliny seem to result from males' close
cooperation in managing common land or cattle estates.
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In patrilineal societies, the children born to a marriage legitimized by bridewealth or bride
service (see "Marital Alliances" below) are members of their father's patrilineage or patrician.
Since descent is traced through fathers, a man and his brother, their children, and their sons'
children are all members of the same descent group. Women are too, but a sister's or daughter's
children will belong to their fathers' groups. Children do recognize kinship links with their
mother's patrilineal relatives and often enjoy especially close ties with their mother's brother,
but such matrilateral (literally, mother's side") links are of secondary importance in the formal
scheme of things. Yoruba women, for example, enjoy the same patrilineal inheritance rights as
their brothers. But where the heritable resources—such as houses, cocoa lands, titles, or
political offices—are in scarce supply, the patrilineal principles of inheritance tend to favor
direct male descendants over sisters' children (Eades, 1980:52, 55-56, 60, 98; Lloyd, 1965:570).
Under patriliny, the lines of descent and authority converge in the person of one's father or
husband. A wife, at the time of her marriage, exchanges the authority of her father for that of
her husband, and in many patrilineal societies, especially in southern Africa, a wife is gradually
absorbed into her husband's patrilineal descent group. Children typically view their father as an
emotionally distant disciplinarian, for whatever affection they may feel toward one another is
compromised by the respect and obedience they owe him as the immediate representative of
their lineage or clan.
Matriliny, on the other hand, is largely confined to a few pockets in or near the coastal
forests of western Africa (e.g., the Asante and other Akan peoples in Ghana), and to the broad
"matrilineal belt" that stretches across the wooded savannas of south-central Africa, from Zaire
and Angola to Tanzania and Mozambique (e.g., the Lamba and Bemba of Zambia). Here,
where warfare was largely external, or where hunting or trading took men away for prolonged

10

periods, and where most of the hoeing and weeding is performed by female work groups, the
residence and descent patterns reflect the advantage of keeping a cooperative and related core of
mothers, sisters, and daughters living together in one place (Ember and Ember, 197 1; Divale,
1974).
Most such societies have either matrilocal or avunculocal residence. Under matrilocality,
the groom leaves his family to live with or near his wife's matrikin, while under avunculocality
the couple lives with or near the husband's mother's brother (avunculus in Latin) and the
husband's matrikin. These two residence patterns can exist in the same society. A Lamba
marriage, for example, is supposed to begin with an extended period of matrilocal bride service.
Then, several years and children later, after proving his ability to care for his wife and children,
the Lamba husband requests permission to remove them to his mother's brother's village.
Should his wife's family refuse him, he can either "lump it" or terminate the marriage.
In matrilineal societies, a person is born into his mother's matrilineage or matriclan
regardless of her marital status or the payment of bridewealth. Descent is traced through
mothers. Thus, a woman and her sister, their children, and their daughters' children all belong
to the same descent group. Men do too, but a brother's or son's children invariably belong to
their own mothers' groups. While children in matrilineal societies recognize some affiliation
with their father's matrikin and often enjoy warm ties with their father, such patrilateral
("father's side") links are of secondary importance when it comes to the inheritance of property,
titles, or political office. For in these societies, one is supposed to inherit such resources from
the mother's brother, the matrilineal authority figure, rather than one's father, as is the case in
patrilineal societies.
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Matriliny is not matriarchy (rule by women), for the formal positions of authority in a
matrilineal descent group are usually held by either brothers or mother's brothers. Neither is it a
mirror image of patriliny, for here the lines of descent and authority are split, and the husband's
authority over his wife and children is strictly limited. A man may be the authority figure for
his sister and her children, but his own wife and children fall under the authority of his brotherin-law. Matrilocal or avunculocal residence only complicates the issue, for a brother, his sister,
and her sons and daughters may all live in different villages. The resulting tensions are, from
the male's perspective, known as the "matrilineal dilemma."
The "war between the sexes" is a daily reality in such societies, and it is one in which
women—at least those who are mothers—have a decided advantage. A mother's interests are
narrowly focused upon the rights of her children, while the father's are divided between two
rival groups—that of his wife and children, on the one hand, and that of his sister and sister's
children on the other. While a married brother must try to balance these competing demands,
his wife and sister need only be good mothers. Mothers can and do exploit men's divided
interests to their own and their children's advantage. Whatever men in a matrilineal society
may say about the inherent weakness and inferiority of women, they find it very difficult to
control their wives and sisters (Beidelman, 1986:17-22). It is little wonder then, at least in
eastern and central Africa, that marriage ties are notoriously more brittle in matrilineal than in
patrilineal societies.
Anthropologists have devoted a lot of print to the question of matriliny's future and whether
or not it restricts economic enterprise. As Mary Douglas (1969) notes, it seems to perform well
under conditions of open opportunities and unrestricted resources. In southern Ghana, for
example, the matrilineal cocoa-farming migrants from the Asante and other Akan peoples enjoy
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a distinct advantage over those from patrilineal societies, for they alone are able to form
cooperative, descent-based "companies" for buying and recruiting labor—at least so long as
their wives and poorer relatives can expect to receive their own farms for their efforts (Hill,
1963, 1986:134-138; Okali, 1983).
But matriliny's conflicting loyalties and diffuse authority relations are not well suited to
conditions of interpersonal competition and restricted resources. Among the matrilocal and
matrilineal Chewa-speaking people of southeastern Malawi (of mixed Nyanja and Lomwe
origins), custom (perhaps reinforced by the present scarcity of land) denies most men access to
their matrilineages' lands, and the land disputes between sisters in a given village have led to a
wider recognition of the lowly, immigrant "sons-in-law" as nuclear family heads (Peters, 1994).
Matriliny does not guarantee female solidarity. But since it generates "a political economy that
minimizes male control of power and resources" (Poewe, 1979:115), most discussions of its
future tend to assume a male perspective.
It is not surprising that Karla Poewe learned that male and female entrepreneurs have
different attitudes toward matriliny. The Luapula River valley, along Zaire's southeastern
border with Zambia, has long hosted the long-distance trade in fish and crops and is famous for
a long tradition of wealthy entrepreneurs. The large fish- or crop-trading businessman in
Zambia's Luapula province has little use for his matrikin's claims for support.

Like the

opportunistic "therapeutic Muslim" converts described in David Parkin's (1972) study of
Kenya's Giriama cocoa entrepreneurs, he becomes a Jehovah's Witness or Seventh-Day
Adventist and uses their ideology of the patriarchal nuclear family to distance himself from
such claims. While such men see matrilineal claims as an economic threat, the large Luapula
businesswoman feels threatened by the marital claims of her husband and his matrikin. She
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avoids the churches her husband prefers. Through multiple divorce and refusal of the levirate
(the inheritance of a deceased man's widow by his brother), she seeks to distance herself from
the claims of her husband and his family and to preserve her wealth for her children's and
brothers' benefit (Poewe, 1980).
In the present century—due to the historical impact of the slave trade, Islam or Christian
mission teachings, labor migration, cash-cropping, and other forms of enterprise—many
matrilineal peoples have adopted some of the customs of neighboring patrilineal peoples (Phiri,
1983; Colson, 1961). Chewa men in both Zambia and Malawi, for example, have adopted the
bridewealth customs of the neighboring Ngoni to obtain permanent custody of their children.
And, with the consequent emergence of patrilocal residence, village headmanships often pass
from fathers to their children, rather than to a sister's children (Phiri, 1983; Skjønsberg, 1989).
Although a similar pattern exists among Lamba villagers, it is most obvious among the
cash-cropping Lamba farmers, who abandoned the "noise" (quarrels) of village life to establish
their own patrilocal extended family farms. They and their sons consider the custom of
matrilineal inheritance to be fundamentally wrong, for how can a man enlist his wife's and
children's help in building a family farm if it will eventually pass to his sister's children? Many
have adjusted their descent lines accordingly.

In one such case, a farmer's sons and

grandchildren deny being members of their mothers' clans, but, instead, claim to be members of
their father's and paternal grandfather's (matrilineal) clan (Siegel, 1984:180-188).
Such a change in inheritance does not necessarily weaken the matrilineal system (Colson,
1980; Peters, 1994). Few people are able to refuse the means of advancement potentially
available through matrikin assistance or inheritance, and the same people who resent the claims
made by their matrikin show no hesitation when it comes to pursuing identical claims of their
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own (Colson, 1980; Poewe, 1980). "The security associated with the extended matrilineal
kinship network is thus still significant"—especially, but not only, for the poor—and
"matrilineal descent is highly adaptive, especially under conditions where one needs access to a
diversity of support" (Colson, 1980:372-373).
Johan Pottier (1988) has documented a parallel trend among the patrilocal and patrilineal
Mambwe, who straddle the Zambia-Tanzania border between Lakes Tanganyika and Malawi.
As described by William Watson (1958), the Mambwe became a classic example of a people
who prospered during the flow of migrant laborers to the Copperbelt mines. The neighboring
Bemba suffered from the loss of male labor migrants because, being matrilocal and matrilineal,
their villages lacked a core of related males (Richards, 1939, 1940). But Mambwe men were
permanently attached to their heritable land and cattle estates at home. So the younger men,
while away, could entrust their wives, children, and garden labor to older patrikin.
But the 1970s collapse of the Zambian copper industry forced many Mambwe back upon
increasingly scarce lands.

Divorced or widowed Mambwe women have always left their

children with their husbands' kin and returned to their fathers' villages. But now, to obtain
secure land rights and cooperative female labor for their cash crop gardens, they remain in their
natal villages even after remarrying. Thus, many villages include a core of matrilocal but
patrilineally related women, each with a mother or daughter living in a Tanzanian border
village. Such mother-daughter links are now a valuable resource, for they serve to establish
family partnerships in the extralegal Zambia-Tanzania border trade. Here, where population
pressure effectively precludes further agricultural intensification, it is ironic that the welfare of
so many patrilineal Mambwe depends upon family ties traced through women (Pottier, 1988).

15

Finally, a handful of peoples in western and south-central Africa practice dual (or double
unilineal) descent. They have both patri- and matrilineal descent groups, though each serves a
different purpose. Among the Yakö of southeastern Nigeria, rights to garden lands are defined
patrilineally, whereas inheritance rights in movable property are transmitted matrilineally. The
basic difference between double and single unilineal descent systems is that under dual descent,
the kinship rights and obligations are split between two different descent groups, each with
divergent interests in the same individual. Analogous descent group rivalries also occur in
single unilineal societies, as when, in a patrilineal society, a mother's brother's patrilineage takes
the part of their sister's son in a dispute with the members of his patrilineage. But here the
rivalries are between descent groups of the same sex.



MARITAL ALLIANCES AND TRANSACTIONS

In Africa, marriage is not so much a union between two individuals as an alliance between
two extended families and descent groups (Sudarkasa, 1980). In some respects, the personal
identities of the married couple are less important than the alliance they represent. African
marriages are most commonly marked by the exchange of bridewealth, formerly (and
misleadingly) called "bride price," in which the bride's group accepts livestock or other
movable property in compensation for the loss of their daughter's labor and fertility. In most
such societies, bridewealth is essential for legitimizing a marriage and its children.
This is rarely paid in full or all at once, for the bride's group maintains some leverage over
their in-laws by keeping the groom and his kin in their debt. Bridewealth expenses vary with
the number of marriageable men and women, herd sizes, and the opportunities for earning cash,
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so they reflect the laws of supply and demand. Yet, if the immigrant Shona farmers in Zambia
are any example, the men and women involved in such transactions do not regard bridewealth
as the calculated buying and selling of wives but as symbolic tokens of women's value (Siegel,
1984:223-229).
Where bridewealth involves a substantial amount of property, older men can use their
greater wealth to monopolize the supply of younger, marriageable women and, by contributing
to their bridewealth, to gain influence over their junior kinsmen wanting to get married. Such
influence is always resented, but this is especially true when, instead of helping his adult sons, a
man uses his wealth to accumulate additional young wives for himself.

This kind of

selfishness, however, has its own risks, because such a situation can turn ugly and divisive
should the father discover that his young wife is romantically involved with one of his sons.
Bridewealth can also operate to strengthen marriage ties. The cruel, abusive husband might
forfeit his bridewealth and alienate his kinsmen if his wife should leave him. The same is true
for the wife, because, unless she has sound reasons for deserting her husband, her kinsmen must
refund their shares of her bridewealth. Since both groups have a vested interest in perpetuating
a given marriage, high bridewealth payments are associated with low divorce rates. It was
precisely this realization that forced the Christian missionaries in Botswana to abandon their
opposition to the "heathen" custom of "bride price" (Schapera, 1940:74-76).
In still other African societies, marriage is marked by the custom of bride service. This is
particularly true where the tsetse fly (and sleeping sickness) prevents the accumulation of
livestock. Here the groom, like the biblical Jacob, offers his parents-in-law his labor instead of
property. From the male's perspective, this has several disadvantages over bridewealth. First, it
requires the husband to accept a subordinate position in his wife's village. Since his labor is his
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own, he has no relatives to defend his interests, while his wife can rely upon her family's
support in any dispute.

Such marriages are more unstable, and the husband forfeits his

investment should the marriage end. It is little wonder, then, that those societies that emphasize
bridewealth exchange regard bride service as an inferior, "poor man's" alternative.
Two other customs reflect the alliance aspect of marriage: the levirate and the sororate.
Given both the desire for children and the distinctly complementary roles of men and women in
the sexual division of labor, marriage is essential to an active and productive life. Should one
spouse die, the marital alliance provides the other partner with a replacement. Under the
levirate, a man assumes the responsibility for his dead brother's widow and children, while
under the sororate, a woman takes the place of her dead or barren sister. These replacements
need not be actual biological brothers or sisters; rather, they might easily include those cousins
who, according to African systems of (unilineal) descent, are considered "brothers" or "sisters"
of the unfortunate spouse.
African peoples enforce these duties with differing intensity.

They are undoubtedly

burdensome when custom compels a person to perpetuate a marital alliance against his or her
will. But this is equally true when a Christian church, in forbidding polygamy, forces a
respectably married deacon or elder to leave his church for honoring his customary obligations
to his dead brother's widow.

Most peoples, however, permit greater personal choice in

honoring these obligations. Elderly widows and widowers are often tired of marriage and
prefer to live with a married son or daughter. In most respects, the levirate and sororate provide
a valued security net for widows and widowers.
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FAMILY TIES AND SOCIAL ORDER

Family ties are more than a curious feature of African social life, for they also play an
important role in political relations and the maintenance of social order. This is particularly
true in traditionally stateless societies—those decentralized political orders without a
bureaucratic hierarchy and coercive authority, as Thomas O'Toole discusses in Chapter 3—but
the same general features also operate in traditional state-level societies. People everywhere are
socialized to learn the boundaries of expected and acceptable behavior and to share some
concern for what others might think of them. While gossip and slander, ridicule and shame,
and the fear of other negative sanctions are common mechanisms of social control in all
societies, they are particularly potent ones in politically decentralized societies, where the
political, economic, and religious aspects of social life are all wrapped up around family ties.
The Lugbara, for example, are a traditionally stateless horticultural people in northwestern
Uganda. As described by Middleton (1960), the Lugbara live in dispersed, patrilocal, and
patrilineal extended family clusters of some twelve to sixty members. Each extended family
cluster is under the direction of a single male elder, the senior representative of a local lineage
segment. His dependents treat him with a respectful mixture of affection, obedience, and fear,
for, as the custodian of their ancestors' shrines, he has direct access to the guardians of
customary morality. While it is the ancestors who punish their sinful descendants with sickness
and misfortune, it is the family elder who brings such troublemakers to their attention;
therefore, lineage elders—when supported by the ancestors, mystical curses, or special
knowledge of medicines—can use the threat of misfortune to exercise some control over their
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juniors (see Saitoti, 1986:82, 92, 141-143, and Bohannan, 1965:539-543, on the Maasai and
Tiv, respectively).
But misfortunes strike the just and unjust alike, and the fear of such sanctions tends to
backfire where people believe that the same troubles can be credited to jealous, antisocial
witches. The Lugbara family cluster goes through a predictable cycle of internal growth,
conflict, and fragmentation as, over time, its elder finds it increasingly difficult to reconcile his
dependents' competing needs for land. As discontented factions form around the elder's rivals,
the suspicion grows that his witchcraft is the cause of their chronic misfortunes and quarrels.
Here, as among the matrilineal peoples of central Africa (see Marwick, 1965; Turner, 1957),
witchcraft accusations are the standard device used by rival, would-be leaders to split away and
establish their own settlements elsewhere.

When based on the fear of misfortune, such

patriarchal authority often contains the seeds of its own destruction (Middleton, 1960).
Perhaps the most famous example of the political role of familistic ties is Evans-Pritchard's
(1940) classic account of the Nuer and their segmentary lineage organization. Like the Tiv,
who share a similar political organization (Bohannan, 1965:523-525, 531-533), these fiercely
independent cattle pastoralists in southern Sudan are stateless people, and political relations
within and between each of over a dozen Nuer tribes can best be described as an "ordered
anarchy" (Evans-Pritchard, 1940:5-6). The tribe was the largest sovereign and peacemaking
group, which merely means that fellow tribesmen should not raid each other's cattle and that
they should pay compensation for intratribal injuries or killings. Members of different tribes,
on the other hand, may raid each other's cattle, but they should avoid destroying granaries or
killing women and children. No such rules apply where foreigners are concerned.
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Nuer political relations are modeled on the ideology of patrilineal descent. As each tribe
has its dominant clan, the Nuer speak of their villages, districts, and still larger tribal sections as
the localized segments of the dominant clan. Each segment in this genealogical pyramid
corresponds to a similar territorial section of the tribe. These genealogical relations are most
important in pursuing disputes, for most Nuer disputes are settled through the threat of force.
The parties to a common dispute each recruit as many supporters as they possibly can, and it is
the genealogical distance between them that determines whom they can call upon for support.
In general, more closely related lineage segments are supposed to unite against more
distantly related ones.

But as differing disputes involve different levels of genealogical

distance, the rivals in one dispute will be allies in another. Two neighboring villages, for
example, will set aside their quarrels when a new one pits a member of their district against
someone from another. Should these districts belong to different tribes, their quarrel will pit
one tribe against another. Ultimately, all Nuer tribes will unite against a common foreign
enemy. And, Kelly (1985) argues, it was the organizational effectiveness of these dominant
clan genealogies that enabled the nineteenth-century Nuer to cut and occupy a 35,000-squaremile swath through the territory of their Dinka neighbors.
Such situationally determined alliances are only temporary, however. Once the common
threat is removed, each alliance dissolves into its mutually antagonistic segments. A political
system based on the segmentary lineage organization is one of balanced opposition, a constantly
fluctuating equilibrium between the fission and fusion of lineage segments. There is order in
this apparent anarchy, and it is organized and expressed through the plausible sociological
fiction of the dominant clan's patrilineal genealogy.
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A third example of the political role of familistic ties comes from Elizabeth Colson's (1953)
elegant analysis of crosscutting social ties among the Plateau Tonga in southern Zambia. The
Tonga are matrilineal and patrilocal, but every person is considered a member of both his or her
mother's and father's matrilineal descent groups. Ever in search of good land and cooperative
neighbors, these cattle-keeping plow farmers settle wherever they choose. As a result, the
residents of any given village, and of the seven to eight villages in a given neighborhood, are
likely to represent most of the Tonga's twelve dispersed matrilineal clans. Neighbors are bound
by ties of kinship, marriage, and friendship, as well as by cattle loans and the exchange of labor.
One's sense of community has less to do with kinship than with residents' cooperative
interdependence.
One day, at a neighborhood beer drink, a man from the Eland clan quarreled with and struck
a Lion clan man, putting him into a coma. The victim died some days later, and his assailant
was arrested and eventually tried and imprisoned for manslaughter. As Colson (1953) describes
it, the Eland clan elders had long anticipated such problems from this quarrelsome
troublemaker. They had previously enlisted him in the wartime army and, disappointed in his
safe return, had supposedly tried to finish him off with a witchcraft-induced illness. But the
Lion clansmen were not satisfied with his imprisonment and, according to Tonga custom, held
the Elands collectively responsible for their kinsman's death. In precolonial times, the Lions
would have taken revenge against the Elands, thereby precipitating a blood feud.
Though the Elands acknowledged their blood debt, they lacked any way of telling this to the
Lions. Following their kinsman's death, the Lions not only cut off all relations with their Eland
villagers and neighbors but also began threatening the Eland wives married to Lion clansmen.
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Everyone with Lion or Eland spouses was also affected, and the fear of a blood feud soon
infected relations throughout the neighborhood.
This placed a special strain on the victim's village headman. He not only had Lion and
Eland clan wives and children, but his father was the murderer's village headman. As such, he
became the spokesman for all the neighbors with similarly divided loyalties. Working through
his father and his Lion and Eland brothers-in-law, he got the Lions to accept the Elands'
promise of cattle compensation. Although tensions eased, the Elands delayed their promised
payments until the son of an Eland husband and Lion wife fell sick and died. The diviner
determined that the victim's angry spirit had caused the death and would continue to afflict his
relatives until the Elands paid their debt.
Here the diviner, as the mouthpiece of public opinion, forced the Elands to honor their
pledge. But public opinion was shaped by the neighborhood's dense network of crosscutting
social ties. Many individuals—Lions, Elands, and others—had divided loyalties and interests
in this dispute, and it was these same individuals who pressured for a settlement.

This

illustrates that when people of different descent groups must marry, live among, and cooperate
with one another, their crosscutting ties—together with the pervasive fear of feud (Colson,
1974:42-43)—constitute an important mechanism for the maintenance of social order (Colson,
1953; Gluckman, 1955).
Family ties also play an important, if not always central, role in the political organization of
traditional state-level societies. This is probably best illustrated by the Yoruba city-states in
southwestern Nigeria. The Yoruba, the largest of sub-Saharan Africa's ethnic groups, might
best be described as urban peasants, for while most men are cash-cropping farmers, their
permanent homes are in large and densely settled towns (Bascom, 1955). "The Yoruba have
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lived in towns as long as they can remember and despise their townless and kingless neighbors"
(Lloyd, 1965:554).
Among the more populous, northern Yoruba, these towns consist of a central palace and
marketplace surrounded by compound wards, each consisting of a series of linked, rectangular
courtyards that house the members of the compound's patrilocal and patrilineal extended
family. Some rooms in the old-style courtyards are now often leased to strangers, and some
have been razed and replaced by mazes of individual bungalows and two-story houses;
nevertheless, the compound's land remains corporate lineage property.

Although such a

compound is no longer a single structural entity, it "is certainly still a social unit with a strong
sense of its unity and cohension displayed at the regular meeting in the house of its head," or
lineage elder (Lloyd, 1974:115). Such elders from the town's prominent lineage compounds
also inherit their lineages' titled chieftainships and serve on the town's council of senior chiefs.
The precolonial government of the Yoruba city-state was a constitutional monarchy, one
based upon the balanced opposition of its reclusive, sacred king and his council of senior chiefs.
The kingship rotated among the rival houses of the royal lineage, and the king was appointed by
his council of senior chiefs. In theory, the government was invested in this council, and the
king was supposed to accept the decisions of those who had selected him to rule. Just as an
unpopular senior chief could be removed by the members of his lineage, the senior chiefs could
depose the king by requesting that he take his life. The king had no coercive power over his
senior chiefs, but he did have the sacred right to rule, and he could influence the senior chiefs
either by playing them off against each other or by rallying his people's support against the will
of their own chiefs (Lloyd, 1965:567-572). Here, among the Yoruba, residence, titles, and
political organization were all regulated by the principles of patrilineal descent.
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In other traditional African states, such as Buganda (in southern Uganda), kinship became
secondary to contractual, patron-client ties.

Although the Ganda have chiefs of their

exogamous (i.e., out-marrying) patricians and clan segments, such descent groups are not
strongly localized corporate units, and their chiefs now serve as the managing directors of
ancestral burial grounds, a kind of headquarters for their widely dispersed relatives. As the
proverb says, "A man goes to live where he finds people of his own sort," and these do not
usually include close kin. "The Ganda attitude seems to be that kinship is a good thing—but
you can have too much of it" (Southwold, 1965:102).
Originally, the king of Buganda (a position abolished in 1966) was the most prominent of
these hereditary, descent-group chiefs. Over the centuries, the kings gained the right to confirm
their successors to office and, by creating a new category of appointed bureaucrats with
nonheritable titles and estates, established an unusually centralized state under "a despotic
monarch who could remove areas from descent-group control and put in charge of them
personal appointees of his own choosing" (Fallers, 1964:172). As these "king's men" recruited
their own clients as loyal assistants, Ganda society became dominated by the custom of
regularly changing residence and patrons in the search for better prospects (Southwold,
1965:102; 1971:50). Clientship, rather than kinship, became the avenue of social mobility.
Kinship in general is valued, because scattered, distant kinfolk offer a wider choice of
places to live. And where tenuous kinship links cannot be traced, they are readily and regularly
created by adopting strangers into other clans (Obbo, 1979).

Although even unrelated

neighbors are regarded and addressed as relatives (Obbo, 1980:115), precise kinship ties are
considered an irrelevant embarrassment.

The Ganda prefer to use personal names when

referring to relatives outside the nuclear family, and as much as eighty years ago, they had an
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imperfect command of such rarely used kinship terms (Southwold, 1971:50-51). Social life is
dominated by clientship and the linkage of residential and social mobility. "'Friendship is
stronger than kinship,' the Ganda say—though they add that kinship lasts longer" (Southwold,
1965:103).



CONTEMPORARY TRENDS

The Ganda's increasing emphasis on clientship as compared to kinship relations is also
found in the traditional Hausa-Fulani city-states of northern Nigeria (Smith, 1965:134-135) and
among the Hausa traders in the Yoruba towns to the southwest (Cohen, 1969). It certainly
resembles the progression from family-based status and politics to the contractual relations and
territorial political organization envisioned by the nineteenth-century lawyer-anthropologists
and social evolutionists Sir Henry Maine (Ancient Law, 1861) and Lewis Henry Morgan
(Ancient Society, 1877). Yet, it is surely mistaken to think, as they did, that social change
follows an inevitable and unilinear sequence and, accordingly, that African peoples are bound
to arrive at Western patterns of family and kinship organization. To be sure, they are subject to
the same political and economic forces that continue to shape our own society. But in adapting
to these challenges, Africans reinterpret their own family and kinship patterns, and their
disparate and often contradictory adaptations will reflect a distinctly African blend of the old
and new (Epstein, 1981:191-194).
One of the greatest challenges to confront African peoples has been the penetration of the
world economic system; the strains and conflicts generated by this intrusive change have
themselves generated further change. A good example of this is the response of the Tswana (of
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Botswana) to the migrant labor system of central and southern Africa. From 1820 to 1880, first
the Ndebele and then the Boers raided the Tswana for their cattle, grain, land, and labor. The
protests of the British missionaries had little effect until Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa
Company, concerned that the Boers might deny it access to the rumored mineral wealth farther
north, joined their petitions for the creation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885. When
the Rand goldfields were discovered in 1886, a cash hut tax and labor recruitment monopolies
were established among the overcrowded and impoverished Tswana to supply cheap,
subsistence-level labor to the South African gold and diamond mines.
Today, as described by Hoyt Alverson (1978) and Marianne Alverson (1987), 90 percent of
the Tswana males in the Gaborone countryside have participated in the migrant labor system,
while 60 percent of the males in their twenties are away at work at any time—mostly in the
South African mines. Though the Tswana are cattle-keeping plow farmers, only 25 to 30
percent of the households in this area have both land and cattle needed for farming, and rural
productivity clearly suffers from rural poverty and the shortage of able-bodied males. So the
men go off to work—first, because their wage remittances supply the only source of cash and
consumer staples for most rural households and, second, because their savings provide them the
bridewealth they need to marry. The women left behind do gain greater personal freedom
during their husbands' prolonged absences, but this comes at the expense of greater domestic
responsibilities and anxiety for their husbands' return.
But the migrant labor system fosters economic individualism that threatens all kinds of
Tswana family ties. The old ancestral cult, which once supported extended family loyalties,
was largely dead by the late 1920s (Schapera, 1928). Even the nuclear family is threatened, for
"children are less dependent upon parents and less mindful of filial obligations; the social
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importance of producing children has diminished; husbands are not so dependent upon their
wives; and the family is less intimately connected with other social groupings" (Schapera,
1940:320). Youths seek to escape the grinding drudgery of life at home, and most fathers'
estates are so small that the threat of disinheritance provides them little leverage over their
increasingly autonomous sons. Sons are well aware that they can earn their own bridewealth
and consumer goods by working in the mines. Once there, however, they begin to question the
obligation to assist their parents and other relatives, who, they feel, envy their meager material
success. Many become lost to the towns and never return. The older ones who eventually do
go back resent, in turn, the autonomy demanded by their own children and other youths. And
so the cycle repeats itself (Alverson, 1978; Schapera, 1940).
Migrant labor or cash cropping presumes a monetized economy, and this entails economic
individualism and the commoditization of social relations. In general, those with limited access
to money—like women—are the losers. Bridewealth is a good example, because, inasmuch as
the supply of marriageable women is relatively fixed, the monetization of bridewealth payments
often leads to rapid inflation of bridewealth costs (see, for example, Bohannan, 1959).
The switch from bridewealth paid in cattle to that paid in cash has had particularly
devastating effects upon women among Zulu, Swazi, and other patrilineal peoples of southern
Africa (Ngubane, 1987). Here the monetization of bridewealth has transformed it from a
cooperative alliance between two extended families into a purely private transaction between
the bride's husband and her father, for they alone are involved in calculating—and giving and
receiving—her monetary value as a commodity. As such, neither the bride's nor the groom's
extended family has much of a stake in the success of such a marriage. And since the cash
transaction eliminates most of the former marriage ceremonies, the bride and her mother are
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denied not only the ceremonial cattle they once received but also the capital assets, the social
and economic security, and the ritual power they represented.

But the transformation to

monetized bridewealth has also stimulated an increased demand for traditional healers and
medicines and for new spiritual cults among women seeking to reverse their situation
(Ngubane, 1987).
Reports concerning the death of the extended family are, to paraphrase Mark Twain, both
exaggerated and premature. It is often claimed, for example, that the extended family system is
an obstacle to economic development and that the obligatory diversion of scarce resources to
assist less fortunate relatives is not only wasteful but discourages entrepreneurship and capital
accumulation. One can—and Africans do—debate the wastefulness of assisting every needy
relative. And while they take pride in this extended family safety net, it does not always work.
In times of crisis, orphans, the elderly, and hungry poor must instead depend upon the mercy of
formal welfare or relief institutions (Iliffe, 1987:212-213, 245-250).
Still, the economic criticisms of the African extended family system are only half-truths.
Much of the assistance given to relatives goes to "the genuinely poor and needy, for whom the
state provides no support," whereas the assistance given to finance relatives' schooling surely
benefits the entire society. And where wealth and generosity are the traditional path to prestige,
as in West Africa, such familial expectations can sometimes be a stimulus rather than a
hindrance to entrepreneurship and economic development (Lloyd, 1969:90-92).
There is little doubt that the strain of extended family obligations is most strongly felt by the
urban and educated African elite, since they often constitute the first and most important
resource—both for food and lodging and personal contacts—for the school-leavers seeking
work in town. "The average young Yoruba uses his kin-based network," particularly his close,
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well-to-do relatives, "with [the] expectation that this is the best way to secure not only a job but
also a particular kind of job." Such hospitality is, however, both a financial and emotional
drain, and it tends to wear thin over time. "In several cases, senior civil servants who had
grown tired of the demands made on them, had rented slum accommodation for their younger
brothers and nephews" (Gutkind, 1977:253; also Iliffe, 1987:172, 180-18 1). By the same
token, unemployed relatives resent being put to work as house servants for their wealthier kin,
so they eventually construct their own job-seeking networks and strike out on their own.
It is important to note here that the strength of family ties and obligations varies among
different African peoples. Yoruba and Luo (Kenya) job seekers rely upon their urban relatives
for assistance, while the lbo tend to rely upon unrelated homeboys from their village
improvement associations (Gutkind, 1977). The Luo migrants to Nairobi are famous for the
strong patrilineal organization that links urban and rural kin (Parkin, 1978). But ethnicity is just
one of the social identities that determine the strength of kinship ties between town and country.
In East London, South Africa, for example, the "Red" (i.e., "traditional") Xhosa migrants
remain encapsulated within their patrilineal networks of homeboy ties, while the "School" (i.e,
urban, mission-educated) Xhosa are largely lost to their rural kin; but they are characterized by
broader social networks composed of like-minded friends and selected maternal and paternal
relatives (Mayer, 1971; Pauw, 1972).
African elites are generally tied to their rural kin. Most, however begrudgingly, send
some money home—at least to the parents or other kin who reared them. The elite may,
depending upon their relatives' needs, the state of the national economy, and the cost of urban
life, entrust their children to their parents' care back home. Others provide school fees and
lodging for their own or for favorite classificatory brothers or sisters and put up relatives
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visiting the hospital or market. The gifts of food these visitors bring can be a welcome
supplement to the household diet. Elite wives have a particular investment in maintaining these
extended family ties because not only might they recruit a relative to provide childcare when
they are away at work, but such ties also offer an insurance against the risk of divorce. And
elite men must certainly maintain their family ties if they intend to retire among their relatives
at home (Oppong, 1981).
The government bureaucrats in Jacobson's (1973) study of the Mbala elite are an exception
that proves the rule. These "itinerant townsmen" are likely to be transferred many times in their
careers and, at the expense of their poorer, rural relatives, to invest their energies in cultivating
a wide network of similarly privileged friends of friends. Because they intend to retire in or
around Uganda's urban centers, they can afford to neglect their relatives' annoying requests for
aid and even manage to "forget" their kinship ties to lower-class relatives. This is not, he notes,
the general pattern elsewhere in Africa (Jacobson, 1973:57-58, 131-137).
Yet, such family ties often place a real emotional strain on African elite marriages,
particularly between the wife and her in-laws. The partners to such marriages are often from
different ethnic groups, and the husband's kin may, if they disapprove of his wife's background,
do everything to sabotage the marriage (e.g., Schuster, 1979:128-129). In turn, the wife may
object when her lower-class in-laws insist on their customary rights to coresidence, property,
and financial maintenance. Such couples may attempt to whittle down their extended family
obligations in an attempt to realize the Euro-American model of the closed and cooperative
nuclear family couple. But old customs die hard, and this is an elusive goal for the firstgeneration African elite who have little previous experience of geographical and social
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mobility. Such adjustments, as Oppong (1981) shows, are far easier for the rare second- and
third-generation members of the African elite.
Another problem confronting elite couples are the children from previous marriages or
affairs. Among the elite and subelite couples in Lusaka, the general "'rule' is that the man's
wishes are paramount" (Schuster, 1979:108). Because household size is a measure of a man's
personal prestige, his previous children are reclaimed from their natural mother, while the wife
farms hers out to her maternal kin (Schuster, 1989:107-108, 129-130). A similar pattern seems
to prevail among the African elite who live in Kampala, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and abroad
(Obbo, 1987).
Given the cultural emphasis on childbearing, the elite woman courting a particular man
must prove she will make a chaste and faithful wife and also demonstrate her fertility. She thus
uses pregnancy as a tool—whether it be to lure a man from his older wife, to try to hang on to a
man, or to nudge one into marriage. If she fails, she is stuck with an "outside" child who may
well resurface, some six to seventeen years later, at the father's home. Given the fierce
competition for elite men and her limited hold on her husband, the elite wife has little choice
but to ignore her husband's extramarital affairs; instead, she perpetuates the mythical distinction
between "good" and "bad" women by focusing her anger on rival female "home wreckers"
(Obbo, 1987; Schuster, 1979).
The institution of polygyny persists among the African elite. The Nigerian elite disapprove
of traditional "public" polygyny as a "lesser" form of marriage practiced only by "bush"
Africans. Nonetheless, according to Karanja (1987), the vast majority of elite men practice
"private" polygyny with "outside" wives. Female undergraduates refuse to date their male
counterparts. They prefer an "outside" marriage with "a 'mature' man, who will I set them up
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nicely' immediately after graduation, rather than insisting upon entering a first marriage with a
'struggling' fellow [student]" (Karanja, 1987:256).

While this preference sets up intense

conflicts with the male students, it is only the older "sugar daddies" who can provide these
future elite women with a rented flat, monthly pocket money, children's allowances, a car, and
all-expense-paid shopping trips to the Euro-American capitals.
The overwhelming majority of elite Nigerian women fiercely disapprove of these
relationships, but they are unable to prevent them. Their husbands, however, enjoy the benefits
and prestige from their peers. They defend such arrangements as a return to African tradition
while retaining the semblance of monogamy for public consumption. As in Schuster's (1979)
study, men and women entertain very different conceptions of what marriage entails. Although
these different conceptions generate considerable tension between husbands and wives, the men
continue to do just as they please (Karanja, 1987). As I once heard an African elite male tell a
class of outraged female graduate students in the United States, "Africa is still a man's world," a
point well documented by April Gordon in Chapter 10.



CONCLUSIONS

African family and kinship systems seem to be headed in varied and apparently
contradictory directions. The competition for land and other scarce economic resources often
seems to work against matrilineal descent. Yet it persists, and one finds an increasing trend
toward female-headed households and the cultivation of matrilateral kin among even the most
decidedly patrilineal peoples. Although the penetration of the world economic system has
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fostered economic individualism, the narrowing of kinship relations, and greater selectivity of
relatives included in personal networks, the same individuals try to maintain, and even create, a
wide network of real and fictive kin on whom they can rely for support and assistance. While
the specific patterns of African marriage and family forms continue to change, we see the new
forms take on old meanings, and old forms invested with new ones. Whatever happens,
African marriage and family forms will remain distinctly African. They will never be pale
imitations of our own.
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